Browsing by Subject "Water governance"

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Collaborative water governance in Thailand
much ado about nothing?
(2015) Kanjina, Sukit; Hoffmann, Volker
The river basin committee (RBC) framework was first introduced in Thailand in 2002, and the current one adopted in 2007 has been implemented in all 25 river basins located in the country ever since. By all accounts, the RBC framework is innovative as far as Thailand’s administrative system and water resource sector are concerned. It was only recently that the former started to promote non-public sector participation, and the underlying legal framework expressly requires that representatives of the non-public sector, such as water user organizations and local experts, be included in the RBC together with those representing the public agencies concerned. The latter envisions the RBC as a new mechanism for managing water resources by using a river basin as a managerial unit. Based on the RBC framework’s prescription, it can be seen that Thailand is moving toward collaborative water governance, where both public and non-public sector representatives take part in decision making on water resource-related issues in their respective river basin. This study empirically examines the implementation process and outcomes of the RBC framework by using the Ping RBC arrangement as an illustrative case. It aims specifically to explore the formation and management of the RBC, its collaborative processes and participation, and the outcomes it generates. To this end, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants such as the officials responsible from Water Resources Regional Office 1 (WRO 1), and Ping RBC members; and an informal interview was applied as well with some DWR officials. In addition, relevant activities were observed through non-participant observation, while related documentary data, e.g. documents on the RBC framework, also were collected. The data gathered were analyzed by means of qualitative content analysis. It was found overall that the Ping RBC framework was established by following relevant directives. Ping RBC members include representatives from the public sector such as the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and Department of Water Resources (DWR), as well as the provincial governors concerned and representatives from the non-public sector, including water user organizations (agricultural, industrial, commercial, service, and tourism sectors), local government organizations (LGOs), and the expert group; while WRO 1 serves as the secretariat. In addition, other governing bodies were established as well, including one river basin sub-committee, five provincial river basin working groups, and 20 sub-river basin working groups who, similar to Ping RBC members, represented both the public and non-public sector at the river basin, provincial, and sub-river basin level. It was discovered that regarding RBC management the Ping RBC and its governing bodies were governed by the lead organization-governed form, where WRO 1 played the leading role and left no room for involvement from other members. For example, it called the meetings and prepared their agenda. Indeed, meetings were the only activity organized for these river basin governing bodies and they were infrequent (e.g. twice per year for the Ping RBC). Furthermore, they were organized with a formal format, where the officer responsible normally provided information to the meeting, with virtually no deliberation or discussion. With these meetings being the only activity where members of the river basin governing bodies could get together, it was apparent that face-to-face dialogue, which is a crucial element in leading to others elements in a collaborative process, such as trust and shared understanding, was simply non-existent. Interaction between the secretariat and members of the river basin governing bodies, as well as among the members also failed to occur. Participation in the Ping RBC setup involved just information sharing, as members of the Ping RBC and its governing bodies were provided with only data on, for example, drought and flood situations. The governing bodies of the Ping River Basin, especially the Ping RBC, took part in approving river basin management and development frameworks as well as annual river basin management and development plans. However, their approval was unnecessary because the frameworks and annual plans in question were a collection of project plans gathered from the public agencies concerned and LGOs located in the river basin. They were prepared based on relevant policies and directives, with no need for approval from the Ping RBC setup before submission for national budget allocation. Since the frameworks and annual plans were the only outputs produced, it was therefore apparent that the Ping RBC framework performed virtually no functions to fulfill its mandates such as a water resource management plan, water user priority or water allocation. Evidently, the Ping RBC framework is an ineffective mechanism that is characterized by lack of collaboration, participation and outcomes, which have impacts on water resource management in the river basin. A similar result can be expected from the other 24 RBCs operating under the same administrative system and legal framework. Therefore, Thailand is still far from achieving collaborative governance in its water resource sector. Clearly, this unsuccessful RBC framework was influenced by the Thai administrative system; for instance, the public agencies involved have to follow their own policies and directives, thereby failing to make the RBC framework their top priority and only passively participating in the setup. However, the underlying cause is due largely to the RBC framework’s lack of authority. This is because the legal framework regulating the RBC framework has limited legal authority; consequently, virtually no authority is delegated to this arrangement. Accordingly, the RBC framework has no full authority regarding water resource management as its decisions, if any, can be enforced upon only public agencies and state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, it also has less authority when compared to other public bodies governed by superior legal frameworks; as such, it cannot force active participation in the RBC arrangement, and is not officially recognized (e.g. by the budget allocation system). It can be seen as important that with no authority delegated, non-public sector representatives do not share any decision making power despite their inclusion into the framework concerned. Therefore, to avert the same result generated by the RBC framework in moving toward collaborative water governance, policy changes are needed regarding its authority and implementation process at the national level, or at the DWR. Ideally, a change is required at the national level by passing a comprehensive legal framework, i.e. a Water Act. By this law, the RBC framework’s authority in managing water resources is secured and the framework itself is officially recognized. Arrangements for implementation of the RBC framework also can be prescribed, e.g. a budget allocation system recognizing the RBC framework and creating the RBC’s own office. However, this option is rather difficult to achieve, if not impossible, due to the lack of political support. A more probable change at the national level would be to issue a new regulation that revises the RBC framework, which can be done more easily than passing a law. Essentially, under this new regulation, the new RBC framework would be based at the provincial level. As such, the RBC would be abolished, while the provincial RBC and its governing bodies would be transformed to ‘collaborative watershed partnerships’ focused on a provincial river basin master/action plan. By this new regulation, the public bodies concerned would be obliged to follow the plan mentioned when preparing their water resource-related projects/programs, which would be applicable within authority of the regulation. In addition, diverse activities (e.g. meetings and capacity building) should be organized in order to support both the river basin governing bodies and implementing units of the DWR. The DWR should change its policies regarding implementation of the RBC framework, if there is no change at the national level, and the RBC framework continues to be carried out under the current regulation. It is essential in this circumstance for the DWR to encourage a revision of the RBC structure in order to make it less complex and more manageable, and shift the focus from the RBC itself to the river basin governing bodies at the provincial and sub-river basin level. Besides capacity building activities, and frequent and less formal meetings, the DWR should also direct its implementing units to facilitate the river basin governing bodies in order to develop a river basin management plan for respective provinces. This should be based on the problems and needs of the sub-river basins located in those particular provinces; and presented through the public agencies and LGOs concerned for consideration and inclusion in their own plans. This might be the only way to increase the likelihood of some elements of the river basin management plan being realized, given that the RBC framework has no authority or official recognition.
Exploring the governance of traditional water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province, Northern Iran
(2019) Mirzaei, Arezoo; Knierim, Andrea
This study explores the governance of water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province, Northern Iran, from the perspective of public and private sectors at the regional level, as well as local stakeholders within the communities. Although water management in Iran has been frequently investigated, research which specifically addresses the governance of water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province from perspective of various stakeholders is not existent. The traditional water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province called Ab-bandan are used to collect the precipitation during autumn and winter seasons to be used for irrigating rice fields during the growing seasons (spring and summer). In spite of these reservoirs, a significant amount of precipitation runs off into the sea through rivers and only less than 10% of precipitation is being stored in Ab-bandans. This is due to the challenges in governing these water reservoirs such as lack of strategic planning of administrative bodies. This draws attention to the poor governance of water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province, which presents a major challenge to ensure the security of water supply, and in particular for rice production. Thus, the objectives of this study are: 1) to identify gaps in the governance of Ab-bandans, 2) to identify and assess the policy instruments for the improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans, and 3) to investigate the influence of social capital components on the governance of Ab-bandans among local stakeholders. These objectives form the papers of this cumulative Ph.D. dissertation. The first paper reveals water governance gaps with the focus on Ab-bandans using the ‘OECDs Multi-level Governance Framework’ as a conceptual basis. This framework is a guideline for policy-makers in all countries in order to distinguish public governance gaps regardless of the institutional setting. Identifying the gaps could provide an input for policy-makers in order to prioritize options to strengthen the governance of Ab-bandans. A modified Delphi technique was used to identify these gaps by face-to-face interviews and ranking round. Interviews were conducted with individuals working in public agencies and the private sector pertaining to water management. The results show that the lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans is perceived as the most acute gap. However, the significant issue is that there is interdependence among all the gaps and they can strengthen one another. Therefore, a holistic perspective is needed to understand and resolve the gaps in the governance of Ab-bandans. There is no magic or ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to overcome the gaps and a mix of solutions is required. The second paper refers to identify relevant water policy instruments and assessing the suitability of these multiple instruments in an integrated way towards good governance of Ab-bandans. Water policy instruments are tools, strategies, and mechanisms for policy-makers to overcome governance obstacles in water policy; for instance, involving sub-national governments in designing water policy beyond their roles as implementers is a policy instrument to foster effective water management. An exploratory sequential design was realized as a mixed methods approach (qualitative and quantitative) for the purpose of research. The results reveal that policy instruments identified properly contribute to the improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans. Participation and collective action among farmers have the highest priority for the improvement of water governance. Therefore, it can be seen as the starting point for the desired transformation. Moreover, the policy instruments are interdependent and shouldn’t be addressed in isolation. The improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans should be systematic and it is not possible to apply a single policy instrument without considering the impact of other policy instruments. It is necessary to adopt the policy instruments in a holistic way to solve difficulties in the governance of Ab-bandans. The third paper explores aspects of social capital in the governance of Ab-bandans seeking explanations as to how and why components of social capital among various local stakeholders influence the water reservoirs-related interactions within the communities. Social capital is an important factor, which facilitates collective interaction of the local community’ members for water system sustainability. Therefore, this study investigates key social capital components (i.e. trust, co-operation, social network cohesion, leaders and their roles, and conflict resolution) affecting the governance of Ab-bandans among local stakeholders. The qualitative method was applied to achieve the purpose of research. Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a range of local key stakeholders of Ab-bandans. The study shows that the level of social capital and its importance can differ depending on which component is under investigation. According to the results, mechanisms for conflict resolution are the most important aspect of social capital which plays a significant role for the other components. Social relationships and cohesion are being reduced due to the conflicts in water management and lack of appropriate mechanisms for resolution. Therefore, resolution of conflicts can bring people together in the group events to communicate and address their common issues and promote their co-operation for collective decision-making and planning. The results of the study support the idea that the management of Ab-bandans in a collective manner at the local level in the Mazandaran province needs to take all components of social capital into consideration. This would enable local communities to be more resilient in the face of collective action problems. Overall, it can be concluded that managing water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province, Northern Iran requires collaborative efforts between various stakeholders within and between the local communities. The government should undertake the role of facilitator rather than governmentality, by using participatory and bottom-up processes for decision-making, planning, and resolving conflicts among local stakeholders. The government should establish effective strategies of governance to engage farmers in management decisions and empower and integrate them to be able to solve their problems in water-related issues. There is also an urgent need for co-operation and participation not only between local stakeholders and responsive public agencies at the regional level, but also among public agencies in charge of water policy design and implementation. As the government is the owner and manager of water resources, better management and utilization of Ab-bandans will only succeed if accompanied by a shift in public governance through the engagement of all relevant actors.